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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------------------------------L. CRAIG KNUDSON, a/k/a
LEWIS CRAIG KNUDSON,

)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

vs.

)

Case No. 18162

)

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES and
GOLDIE KNUDSON,

)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

--------------------------------------------------------------STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for reimbursement for reasonable
child support from the father of a child arising from a grant
of public assistance by the Utah State Department of Social
Services to the mother of the child on and for the benefit of
the child, prior to the entry of any order of support.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Utah State Department of Social Services initiated
administrative proceedings against L. Craig Knudson pursuant to
Title 78, Chapter 45b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
After hearing, the administrative law judge ordered that the
Utah State Department of Social Services was entitled to reimbursement from L. Craig Knudson in the amount of $ 729.00. The administrative order was appealed to the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County and reviewed by the Court without argument

by the parties, as the parties had stipulated that the case could
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be decided upon the briefs filed.. The Honorable G. Hal Taylor
upheld the administrative order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirrnance of the Lower Court's
decision and Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except as stated below, Respondents agree with the
Statement of the Facts (and Summary of the Facts) set forth in
the Brief of Appellant. Exceptions numbered 1, 2 and 3 are not
deemed material to the issues rais.ed oh appeal 1 but are made
for over-all consistency in response to Appellant's brief. The
exceptions are as follows

(page numbers refer to the Brief of

Appellant) :
1. statements concerning L. Craig Knudson's prior
employment and date of employment with LaBelle's (in relation
to the birth of the child) are not in the record (page 2) .
2. statement that Goldie Knudson accepted the security
deposit is not in the record (page 3). The record states only
that a security deposit was received; but not by whom it was
received (R. 44, 59).
3o statements concerning details of the parties

separation (page 3), e .. g. "grand opening" are not in the record.
4. statement that L. Craig Knudson and Goldie Knudson
had reached an oral agreement for free rent in lieu of cash
support payments (page 4) is supported in the record only by
L. Craig Knudson's assertion that he recited such an agreement to

-2-
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a gentlemam

who called him from the State of Utah (R. 46) -

there is no evidence that an agreement was made, i.e. the
record does not state the particulars of the agreement and the
time, date, terms and mutual consent of the parties.

L. Craig

Knudson merely stated that he did not make enough money to
support himself and pay her obligations (R. 46) and thereafter
believed, subjectively, that

in-kind payments satisfied his

obligations of support. There is no evidence that this was the
agreement of Goldie Knudson. The record therefore does not support
the second summary statement of fact (page 8) .
5. statement that Lo Craig received the first telephone
call during October, 1978 (page 4). He received the call October
or November, 1978 (R. 46).
6. the failure to state that, prior to the first
telephon call, L. Craig Knudson received a letter from the Utah
State Department of Social Services demanding reimbursement
which he totally ignored (R. 46).
7. stateme.nt that L. Craig Knudson hoped to effect a
reconciliation is not in the record (page 4). He merely recited
that he saw Goldie Knudson for a period on a daily basis because
of an accident. His intentions were not stated (R. 50~51).
8. statement that no order of temporary alimony or
child support was entered in the divorce action because L. Craig
Knudson was paying the expense-s associated with the housing of
Goldie Knudson and the child (page 6 and seventh summary statement
of fact, page 9). The record is completely silent as to the reason
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no temporary order was entered (R. 39).
9. statement that since entry of the Decree, L. Craig
Knudson has complied with all provisions thereof is not in the
record (page 6).
10. technically the statement that Goldie Knudson
was not called as a witness at the administrative hearing is
correct (page 7); however, she was sworn (R. 50) and, although
the s1brict forma;lities of case presentation were not followe.d
at the hearing, her statements are relevant.
11. the fifth and sixth summary statements of fact
(page 8) are not in the record but legal conclusions stating
the facts to be as the Appellant contends them.
It is submitted that the facts are to be presented
and viewed favorable to the order of the Lower Court and that
the forgoing exceptions meet that requirement.
ARGUMENT
To facilitate the presentation of Respondent's
arguments, the Appellant, L. Craig Knudson, shall hereinafter
be referred to as "CRAIG"; the Respondent, Goldie Knudson,
shall hereinfter be referred to as "GOLDIE"; and the Respondent,
Utah State Department of Social Services, shall hereinafter
be referred to as "DEPARTMENT".
POINT I: THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES' RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCRTINE OF RES
JUDI CATA
The Appellant accurately states the basic principles

-4-
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of res judicata, .namely:
(1) the present case involves the same parties or
their privies as the prior action;
(2) a final order or judgment has been rendered in
the prior action; and
(3) the issue in question in the present case
was actually raised and decided, or could have
been raised and decided, in the prior action.
Respondents agree with the Appellant that in the instant case,
the second principle (or standard) has been met; but contends
that neither the first principle nor the third principle are
met.

The divorce action, GOLDIE KNUDSON, plaintiff, vs.

L. CRAIG KNUDSON, defendant, in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County, Stateof Utah, Civil number 71529,
constitutes the prior action under the Appellant's res judicata
argument.

It is· submitted that (a)· the instant case involves

neither the same parties nor their privies as the prior action;
and (b) the issue in question in the instant case was neither
raised, nor could have been raised, in the prior action.
The key factor to be considered is that on November
2

29, 1978, Goldie

assigned to the Department all monies payable

to her or for her child from Craig.

The Assignment of

Collection of Support Payments is part of the record (R.

)

and a copy is included in the appendix, page20, marked Exhibit
A.

It is clear that the Assignment of Collection of Support

Payments was a complete and total assignment of all rights to
collect support from Craig.

Under the well established

principles
of assignments, at the time Goldie filed an action
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for divorce, she had no legal right to collect, or attempt
to collect, support from the Appellant for any month during
which she had received public assistance from the Department ..
When the Appellant argues that the "Department
freely admitted in the course of its argument (R .. 144) that
it is in privi ty with a party to the prior proceeding
(Goldie) .... " and asserts privity with Goldie (a)

as a matter

of fact by virtue of a written contract and (b) as a matter
of law because of the derivative nature of the Department's
claim, the Appellant misstates the legal effect of the
assignment.

Once an assignment is made, the assignee is the

real party in interest and entitled to maintain an action
on the assigned righto
(Utah

Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464

1962); Campbell v. Peter, 162 P.2d 754 (Utah 1945).

The assignor cannot sue the debtor.

First National Bank of

Topeka v. United TelephoneAss'n Inc., 353 P.2d 963 (Kan. 1960);
Wyoming Wool Marketing Ass'n vs. Urruty, 394 P.2d 905 (Wyo.
1964); Harambee Enterprises, Inc. v. State Board of Agriculture,
511 P. 2 d 5 O3 (Co lo.

19 7 3) •

In the case of International Resources v. Danfield,
599 Po2d 515 (Utah

1979) this Court ruled that the doctrine

of res judicata does not bar an assignor from maintaining an
action against a debtor even though the assignee had brought
a prior action.

In

the case of Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK

Corp., 571 P.2d 1339 (Utah

1977) this Court similarly ruled

that a mortgagee (assignee) was not barred from maintaining
an action since it was not party to prior litigation by the
defendant.

It is therefore clear that und~r a~f;i anmPnt-_ law·
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the assignee and assignor are not considered to be in
privity so as to support a defense of res judicata.
On November 29, 1978, Goldie had not filed for
divorce.

Appellant urges that the Department's failure to

appear in the divorce action is fatal.

The record does not

present any evidence that the Department had notice of the
divorce action.

To assert that such failure to appear

jeopardizes the Department's assigned rights, the Appellant
must have established that the Department had notice of the
divorce proceeding and opportunity to be heard.

In the case

of Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978), the defendant-respondent had argued that a prior action by others who
had identical claims to the plaintiff-appellant gave ri·se to
the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment.

In

ruling in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, this Court stated
(citation omitted) at pages 343 and 344:
As to the matter of collateral estoppel, it is to be noted Ruffinengo
.was not a party nor in privity with a
party in the prior suit against Miller.
Consequently, he cannot be bound by
that proceeding.
Collateral estoppel
is not a defense as against a litigant
who was not a party to the action and
judgment claimed to have created an
estoppel.
The proposition was clearly stated
in Blonder-T·ongue v. Uni ve·rsi ty of
r·llinois Foundation as follows:
Some litigants--those who
never appeared in a prior
action--may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue.
They never
had a chance to present their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence and arguments on
the claim.
Due process
prohibits estopping them
despite one or more existing
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely
against their position.
It is also to be noted that if the
doctrine should be applied to these
facts that Ruffinengo would be denied
his constitutional right to appeal
because he was not a party to the
prior sui to
0

•

0

•c.

Miller's further contention that
Ruffinengo was "in privity" simply
because he had an identical right to
his neighbor's that was 9reviously
adjudicated is not persuasive. This
is so for two basic reasons:
(1) It is not at all unforeseeable that Ruf finengo might
reach a different result than
did the other lot owners in the
prior suit, simply because he
may present a far different
or convincing case.
(2) This court has a consistent
policy of resolving doubts in
favor of permitting parties to
have their day in court on the
merits of the controversy.
To rule in the instant case that the divorce action by Goldie
barred action by the Department on its assigned right would
result in denying the Department due process under the law.
The Department would also be denied their constitutional right
of appeal.

The other considerations stated in the above quote

similarly have bearing on this matter.
The mere fact that the Department's Assistance Payments

-8-
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Administration Office approves an application for public
assistance for a person, and takes update information thereafter at approximate six-month intervals, does not mean that
such person advises the Department of every thing they subsequently do.

Goldie was initially asked about any divorce

action, but none was pending at the time of her application.
The Department was not notified when the divorce complaint
was filed or the divorce hearing was conducted.

The Depart-

ment, as assignee, had a legally protected right to reimbursement.

The written assignment cannot now be ignored, or

in effect rescinded, by saying that Goldie somehow reassurned
those rights at the time of the divorce -- in essence -rewriting the agreement of the Department and Goldie -- and
adjudicated the Department's rights with violating the due
process and right of appeal of the Department.
The divorce proceedings were conducted upon a
written Stipulation and Property Agreement between Goldie
and Craig· (R. 66, 69), Section 78-45b-3 (4), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, provides:
(4) No agreement between any obligee
and any obliger either relieving an
obliger of any duty of support or responsibility therefor or purporting to settle
past, present, or future support obligations
either as settlement or prepayment s~all
act to reduce or terminate any rights of
the department to recover from that obliger
for support provided unless the department
has consented to the agreement in writing.
This section has direct bearing on the assigned rights of the
Department.

No agreement

even those made in an uncontested

divorce action -- can act to terminate any rights -- especially
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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those vested by written assignment -- of the Department to
recover from an obliger unless consented to in writing by the
Departmento

This provision protects the Department's rights

of due process and appealo

These rights are also protected

by statute under Section 78-45-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, which require an obligee who has received public
notice
assistance to give/in writing to the Department of any action
(including a divorce action) which involves the recovery of
support.

There being no evidence that the Department had

notice of the divorce proceedings, they cannot be bound, nor
can their previously assigned rights be jeopardized in the
divorce proceedingo
Further, in the case of Searle Bros. v. Searle,
588 P.2d, 689 (Utah

1978), this Court at page 691 gave a

legal definition of a person in privity with another and
stated: "Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or
decrees of court, privity means une who interests has been
legally represented at the time.'"

At page 692, 46 Am. Jur.

2d. Judgments, Sec. 530, was quoted with

approval~

to-wit:

A party to the principal case is
regarded as a stranger to the judgment
rendered in the previous action where
he was not directly interested in the
subject matter thereof, and had no
right to make defense, adduce testimony,
cross-examine witnesses, control the
proceedings or appeal from the judgment,
even though he could have made himself
a party to the previous action. The
right to intervene in an action does not,
in the absence of its exercise, subject
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one possessing it to the risk of
being bound by the result of the
litigation, under the doctrine
of res judicata . . . .
{Emphasis added)
The Searle case involved claims tied to a divorce proceeding.
In the instant case, Goldie had assigned her right to receive
support and did not attempt in any way in the divorce proceedings to legally represent the Department's.

The Appellant

places great weight in the fact that Goldie filed an Affidavit
for Order to Show Cause in the divorce action.

The me-.r.e filing

of the affidavit is not legally significant since this Court
has nothing else before ite

The record is void as to whether

an order to show cause was issued, a hearing was conducted, etc.
Conjecture that Goldie realized after filing the affidavit
that she could not pursue an assigned right is just as
plausible as the Appellant's unsupported position that no order
was entered because Craig was already providing support.
The Appellant cites the cases of Mecham v. Mecham,
570 P.2d 342 {Utah 1979} and Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597
{Utah 1978).

In the Mecham case, an explanation was made that

the Department's right of reimbursement were derivative and
no greater than Maxine Mecham's rights.

The first important

distinction with the instant case is that a written assignment,
and the appertenant legal significances of a written assignment, were not at issue or even mentioned.
forms of derivative rights.
instant case.

There can be two

First, those assigned as in the

Such rights in the assignee are no greater than

which the assignor possessed at the time of the assignment.
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Second, statutory rights as in the Mecham case.

The statutory

rights arise under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act, Section's 78-45-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, and the Public Support of Children Act, Sections
78-45b-l et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

These

rights are also no greater than those possessed under the law
by a support obligee and are specified in the statuteso
While neither type of derived right is enlarged, the legal
rights which vest and the protections afforded those rights
are different.

The Mecham case properly decided the Department's

rights under a statutory right of reimbursement, but did not
decide the effects of a valid, written assignment.

Other

distinctions with the instant case are:
{l)

the Complaint for Divorce in Mecham case sought

temporary alimony and child support; no evidence in the
instant case
{2)

o

in the Mecham case, specific orders were made

denying past alimony and requiring the parties to pay debts
incurred since the filing; no such orders in instant case.
{3)

the Department is not herein trying to modify the

decree of divorce, but to enforce their assigned right of
reimbursement which was clearly recognized in the cases of
Reeves v.

Ree~,

556 P.2d 1265 {Utah 1976) and State Division

of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 {Utah 1976).
In the Roberts case, the judgment of the Department
was upheld because the Department had received notice of the
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divorce proceeding and intervened.

This case also dealt

with statutory rights, not assigned rights, and properly
decided the Department's rights under a statutory right of
reimbursement.

It, however, also did not decide the effects

of a valid, written assignment.
POINT II: THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING
At the administrative hearing the Appellant

~as

represented by counsel and testified at great length concerning
his and Goldie's wealth, income and living standards.

The

administrative law judge also considered the Affidavit of
Goldie (filed in the divorce action)

(R.86), which affidavit

was introduced at the hearing by the Appellant.

The evidence

presented covered both. the period they lived together as
husband and wife and the period they lived separate and apart.
The purpose of the hearing was to determine Craig's liability,
if any, under the assignment for the period December, 19781
through July, 1979.

Since this was an assigned right1 the

Department could proceed to determine the liability under any
available method.
of Children Act.

The Department choose the Public Support
For the period in question no court order

existed 1 but the Department had enforceable legal, and assigned,
right of reimbursement as stated in the cases of State Division
of Fa.mily Services v. elark, 554 P. 2d 1310 (Utah 1976) and
Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1976).
Section 78-45b-6(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, which provides:
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(2) The administrative hearing
examiner, after full and fair hearing,
conducted in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the dep.artment shall
make specific findings regarding the
liability and responsibility, if any,
of the alleged responsible parent and
the amount of sich liability computable
on the basis of the amount of assistance
paid or to be paid. In making these
findings, the hearing officer shall
include in his deliberations the
necessities and requirements of the
child, exclusive of any income of the
custodian of said child, the amount of
the support debt claimed, the amount of
assistance paid or to be paid, the
abilities and resources of the responsible
parent, and the public policy and intent
of the legislature to require that
children be maintained from the resources
of responsible parents thereby relieving
to the greatest extent possible the
burden upon the general citizenry through
welfare programs . . . .
and Section

78-45~7,

...

;,;

....

-.:

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

are appropriate statutes by which the hearing was conducted.
One relevant factor to be considered is that within one year
from the period in question the decree of divorce set child
support payments at $150.00 per month.

The evidence developed
....

at the hearing clearly demonstrated that the circumstances of

..

Craig and Goldie were not materially different during the

....

period and at the time of the divorce.

The administrative law

judge is entitled to take notice of the decreed amount and make
a conclusion that the amount was also fair and reasonable for
the approximate year period preceeding the divorce.

The adminis-

trative law judge did not assess Craig for all of the public
assistance payments in violation of pronouncement in the second

-14-
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to last paragraph of the Roberts case.

A lower court is

allowed reasonable discretion in considering the relevant
factors outlined and should not be reversed absent a showing
in the record of abuse of the discretion.

Otero v. Williams,

Case No. 16819 (Utah, filed May 8, 1980).

The Appellant

had a full and fair hearing which allowed him to present his
case and which adduced sufficient information for the administrative law judge to make a determination of support during
the period.
POINT III: A SUPPORT OBLIGOR IS NOT
UNCONDITIONALLY ENTITLED TO CREDIT
FOR IN-KIND PAYMENTS
In the instant case Craig testified that Goldie told
him she was to receive public assistance and that he would be
contacted by "welfare" (R. 45).

He totally ignored their first

dunning (R.46) and claimed that they agreed to his mode of
payment to Goldieo

Such a claim was not accepted.

The

Department's immediate initiation of the notice of Determination
of Financial Responsibility demonstrates the Department's failure
to agree to his mode of payment.

The evidence is not contra-

verted that Craig did pay certain expenses for Goldie, mainly
shelter expenses.

The administrative law judge allowed him

credit for the expenses paid that were actual costs, i.e. the
lot rental, but refused to allow credit for equity payments.
The Appellant asserts that he could have rented the trailer as
an alternative, but this does not take into account the interest
Goldie acquired in the property during their marriage.
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Although

title was in Craig's name, Goldie owned an equity in the
trailero

Respondents cannot find case authority dealing

with pre-divorce in-kind payments..

The intent of child

support is to allow the custodial parents latitude in
deciding the needs of the child and not to permit the noncustodial parent to dictate where the monies are to be
expended.

This intent is clearly stated in the case of Ross

-·.,.

v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979) where at pages 603-604 it
is stated (footnotes omitted):
Plaintiff is entitled, however to
credit for expenditures made on behal.f
of the children or defendant which do
not specifically conform to the terms
of the decree. To do so would permit
plaintiff to vary the terms of the
decree and to usurp from defendant the
right to determine the manner in which
the money should be spent. Only if
the defendant has consented to the
plaintiff's voluntary expenditures as
an alternative manner of satisfying
his alim0ny and child support obligation,
can plaintiff receive credit for such
expenditures ..

....
.......

The Appellant argues that an agreement between Craig and Goldie
'

is operative, but such is not supported by the record.

The

annotation "Right to Credit.on Accrued Support Payments for
Time Which Child is in Father's Custody or for Other Voluntary
Expenditures," 47 ALR 3d 1031, deals with the "in lieu of"
payments relating to accrued child support payments under a
divorce decree.

However,. the same factual problems exist

whenever the Court delves into what sort of monetary value
should be given.

Undoubtedly these factual problems have given

-16-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rise to the general rule "that the father is not entitled
as a matter of law to credit for such voluntary expenditures
when they are made in a manner other than that specified
by the support order or divorce decree .. "

1039).

(47 ALR 3d, page

The general rule is sound because if you begin making

exceptions there is no factual or legal criteria upon which
to base such exceptions.

At what point do benefits begin

and end, how are the benefits determined, and how much credit
should be given are just a few of the questions that come to
mind if petitioner's theories are followed.

The benefit theory

espoused could only lead to an administrative and
mare.

~egal

night-

This is particularly true when the Department is involved,

rather than the parties to the marriage.
The Appellant suggests the Department is substituting
rubrics for reasoning in proposing that there was enrichment
to Craig in making the trailer payments, and that the order of
the Administrative Law Judge was entered on the same basis.
The reasoning for the Department's position is that if the
payments are made for a trailer, a home or a castle and the
obliger is a benefactor to any degree in the increased value
involved, then he is in fact enriched.

In today's housing

market that enrichment may well be a considerable amount.
The obvious problem is that the extent of the enrichment
becomes extremely difficult to determine.

Should the amount be

ascertained by selling the trailer or home, by an appraisal
acceptable to all parties, by a bonefide offer or some other
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formula?

Who should participate in the increased equity value

and to what extent?

Should the Department provide support for

children in all cases while the obliger makes house payments?
As a practical matter, the problems become insurmountable.
What is the simple solution?

Prohibit the "in lieu of" payments.

This solution is certainly not an illogical and incomprehensible theory as suggested by the petitioner, but represents
a workable and sound basis for the resolution of the factual
and legal problems which are inherent with the petitioner's
proposed theories.
CONCLUSION
In the Reeves case, this Court stated "children are
unconditionally entitled to support from their parents and the
State is authorized by law and should be encouraged and aided
as a matter of public policy to see that the responsibility
is borne by them both intitially and in any necessary subsequent
proceedings".

L. Craig Knudson may have assisted Goldie Knudson

out of his desire to become reconciled to her.

There is no

basis under the law, however, to transfer his obligation to
support his dependent minor child to the taxpayers of the State
of Utah.

Both the administrative law judge and the District

Court properly ruled that L. Craig Knudson owes some duty of
reimbursement to the State Department of Social Services.

The

duty placed upon him is not onerous and was reasonably and
fairly adjudicated.

The facts in this case support an order

upholding the decision of the District Court.
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court
sustained the decision

of the lower courte
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. BARCLAY
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
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Utah=DSS-APA

Form 621
Rev 11/77
o

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVlCES
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES
ASSIGNMENT OF COLLECTION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS
For public assistance received or to be received, or for action on the part
of the De rtment of Social Services to effect collection of $upport,

.54?7-~(;L/lJ4-(Soc., Sec.. No. )
hereby assign, transfer and set over to the Department of Social' Services,
Office of Recovery Services, all monies payable to me or my child from any
person as support or alimony. Said assigned amount shall be the amount past due or to become due me or my child.
I,

I further authorize anyone whosoever, to deliver to the Department of

Social Services, Office of Recovery Services, any and all drafts, checks,
money orders or other negotiable instruments to be used by any person
obligated to provide support or alimony.. The Office of Recovery Services
is hereby granted the power of attorney to act in my name in endorsing and
cashing of any and all drafts, checks, money orders or other negotiable
instruments received by the Department as support or alimony payments.
I agree to send or deliver to the Office of Recovery Services any and all
support or alimony I may receive for the period of time I receive public
assistance. I agree that I will not seek to collect child support and
alimony through any alternative method while this assignment is in force.
I authorize the assignee to do every act it deems necessary to collect the
support of alimony payments, including, but not limited to, taking any and
all legal action it deems necessary or the compromising of my or our claims
without further notice to me.

Signature
Address

Date

7J ~

~-~--------------

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, this

_7/._...........~......_-_!t<d;tL
____' ___
. '_ _ ,

191

c>2tf ~

day of

f.

My Corrmission Expires:

I
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